

Heterogeneous Resource Slot Optimization in Multi-Dimensional Recommendation Landscapes: A Submodular Constrained Framework with Cross-Space Spillover Effects

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doi:10.63593/JPEPS.2026.03.05

Abstract

Contemporary large-scale digital platforms face severe challenges in multi-channel resource slot allocation, including cross-channel redundancy, metric fragmentation, fairness-efficiency conflicts, and ignorance of asymmetric cross-space spillover effects, leading to significant losses in revenue and user engagement. This paper proposes AllocOpt, a submodular constrained optimization framework for heterogeneous resource slot allocation in multi-dimensional recommendation landscapes, which explicitly models directed cross-channel spillover effects and integrates efficiency, engagement, and fairness objectives. The framework formalizes cross-channel interactions as a directed acyclic spillover graph, proves the approximate submodularity of the global objective under reasonable constraints, and designs a polynomial-time greedy algorithm with $(1-1/e)$ approximation guarantee. Meanwhile, a contextual Thompson-sampling bandit algorithm is adopted for online learning of spillover parameters, and hierarchical fairness is enforced via stochastic dominance instead of rigid quotas. Validated in 18-month production with over 200 million users, AllocOpt improves allocation efficiency by 38.7%, reduces cross-channel redundancy by 67.4%, enhances user satisfaction by 28.4%, and boosts small merchants' weekly sales by 128.6%, with only 6.3 ms computational latency per optimization cycle. This framework unifies real-time performance, allocation efficiency and ecosystem fairness, and is generalizable to e-commerce, mobility and other large-scale platforms with heterogeneous recommendation surfaces.

Keywords: multi-dimensional recommendation, heterogeneous resource slot, cross-space spillover effects, submodular optimization, stochastic dominance fairness, online learning, real-time allocation

1. Introduction

1.1 The Multidimensional Allocation Paradox in Billion-Scale Platforms

Contemporary digital commerce and mobility platforms operate an intricate ecosystem of display real-estate surfaces that compete for

scarce inventory attention. A representative social commerce platform manages not a singular "home feed," but rather 12 distinct presentation channels: home timeline recommendations, category browsing carousels, push notification slots, email marketing banners, in-app search

result positions, live shopping event highlights, sponsored content zones, merchant storefronts, dynamic sidebar widgets, seasonal promotional displays, algorithmic discovery feeds, and personalized preference-driven layouts. Each channel exhibits distinctive exposure patterns, user behavioral characteristics, and monetization potential.

Concurrently, the supply side faces extreme heterogeneity: a catalog of 200,000+ merchant entities with 50-million-item inventories demonstrates vastly disparate value distributions. A luxury goods merchant generates 2,800 RMB per visible impression, while a commodity seller yields 12 RMB—a 233× differential. Yet platform ecosystem health depends on exhibiting both. Revenue-centric allocation would concentrate inventory in premium channels and high-margin merchants. User experience considerations favor diverse discovery. Fairness mandates equitable merchant opportunity. These objectives exist in fundamental tension.

Industry-standard solutions employ isolated channel optimization: each presentation surface applies independent ranking algorithms (typically learned-to-rank systems trained on click-through rates, conversion funnels, or engagement metrics). This channel-agnostic approach creates a pernicious side effect: an item achieving premium placement in the “home timeline” channel simultaneously occupies cognitive real-estate in the user’s mental model. When that same item subsequently appears in the “search results” channel, it triggers redundancy aversion—a documented cognitive phenomenon where users perceive repeated exposures as decreasingly valuable, sometimes negatively so (banner blindness, ad fatigue). Platform-wide, this redundancy effect dissipates approximately 19–23% of theoretical allocation value, representing hundreds of millions of RMB in forgone revenue and engagement annually.

1.2 Inadequacy of Monolithic Optimization Frameworks

Extant approaches to inventory allocation exhibit structural deficiencies:

Deficiency Category 1: Temporal Decoupling

Traditional capacity planning computes optimal allocations offline, assuming stable demand. Real platforms operate in a constantly shifting landscape: trending topics emerge within minutes, inventory availability fluctuates hourly

(due to seller stock-outs, warehouse capacity constraints), and user preferences drift daily. A 6-hour allocation horizon—standard for many systems—becomes obsolete within its execution window. Yet recomputation costs (typically 2–5 minutes of elapsed time for exact optimization on realistic problem scales) preclude frequent updates.

Deficiency Category 2: Metric Fragmentation

Existing ranking systems optimize for isolated outcomes: click-through rate (CTR), conversion rate (CR), dwell time, or purchase probability. Each ranking model was trained on distinct objective functions, creating misaligned incentives. Item A might maximize CTR (users click due to curiosity but rarely convert), while Item B maximizes CR (fewer clicks but higher transaction value). Independent channel optimization produces outcomes where channels do not reinforce each other; instead, they compete destructively.

Deficiency Category 3: Fairness as Afterthought

Fairness constraints—if present—are imposed post-hoc via quota systems (“allocate 20% to emerging merchants”). Such approaches invariably sacrifice performance: enforcing an emerging-merchant quota often displaces high-performing items, creating visible user experience degradation that triggers complaints and churn. The tension between fairness and efficiency appears irreconcilable under this framework.

Deficiency Category 4: Cross-Channel Blindness

No existing work models the interaction topology between channels. Standard allocation assumes channels are independent “buckets.” In reality, channels are interconnected: a user segment discovering a product through “home feed recommendations” (channel 1) is subsequently more likely to favorably receive that same product in “push notifications” (channel 2). This represents positive spillover. Conversely, heavy presence in channel 1 suppresses engagement in channel 2 due to redundancy (negative spillover). These effects are not symmetric: spillover from channel i to j differs from spillover j to i .

1.3 Novel Contributions

We introduce AllocOpt (Allocation Optimization), a fundamentally new approach to multi-dimensional inventory placement.

Deviating from channel-siloed designs, AllocOpt jointly optimizes all channels while explicitly modeling interaction effects.

Contribution 1: Directed Spillover Interaction Graph

We formalize cross-channel user engagement dynamics as a directed acyclic graph:

$$G_{\text{spill}} = (C, E_{\text{spill}}, \Psi)$$

where channels form nodes, directed edges represent influence pathways, and edge weights $\Psi_{i \rightarrow j}$ quantify the multiplicative impact on user engagement when exposure occurs first in channel i , then channel j . Critically, this captures causal ordering (temporal sequence matters) and asymmetry ($\Psi_{i \rightarrow j} \neq \Psi_{j \rightarrow i}$). This representation is novel; prior work treated spillover as symmetric or ignored it entirely.

Contribution 2: Polynomial-Time Approximation Algorithm with Submodularity Guarantees

We prove that the joint channel optimization problem, despite non-polynomial structure in the worst case, exhibits approximate submodularity under reasonable platform constraints. This enables a greedy algorithm achieving a $(1 - 1/e)$ approximation (63.2% of theoretical optimum) in $O(k \log k)$ time per recomputation, where k is the average candidate pool size.

Contribution 3: Hierarchical Fairness via Stochastic Dominance

Rather than enforce fairness through rigid quotas, we introduce proportional fairness as a probabilistic ordering constraint: merchant m_1 should not receive systematically worse placement odds than merchant m_2 unless m_1 demonstrably underperforms by measurable metrics. This is formalized via stochastic dominance.

Contribution 4: Distributed Online Learning with Convergence Guarantees

Spillover parameters $\Psi_{i \rightarrow j}$ are continuously learned from impression and engagement logs via a contextual Thompson-sampling bandit algorithm. We prove convergence to true spillover parameters at rate $O(1/\sqrt{T})$, where T is the number of allocation cycles.

Quantified Impact (18-month production validation, 200M+ users):

- Allocation efficiency gain: 38.7%
- Cross-channel redundancy reduction: 67.4%

- Merchant diversity improvement: Herfindahl index from 0.318 \rightarrow 0.084 (-73.6%)
- Computational latency: 6.3ms per optimization cycle
- User satisfaction lift: +28.4%
- Small merchant ecosystem growth: 2.1M \rightarrow 4.8M RMB weekly sales (+128.6%)

2. Formal Problem Abstraction and Interaction Modeling

2.1 Multi-Channel Allocation as Constrained Submodular Optimization

Let:

$$C = \{c_1, c_2, \dots, c_n\}$$

denote the candidate set (products, merchant items, campaigns), and:

$$S = \{S_1, S_2, \dots, S_m\}$$

denote m presentation channels, each with capacity $|S_i| = k_i$.

A feasible allocation $\pi = (\pi_1, \pi_2, \dots, \pi_m)$ assigns candidates to channel slots, where π_i maps $\{1, \dots, k_i\}$ to C .

For candidate c , let $\text{Pos}_i(c, \pi)$ denote the position assigned to c in channel i under allocation π (or infinity if absent).

2.2 Utility Function with Spillover Effects

The raw utility of placing candidate c at position j in channel i (without spillover) is:

$$u_i(c, j) = w_i^{(j)} \times \text{CTR}(c, i) \times \text{Price}(c)$$

where

- $w_i^{(j)} = \beta_i \times \gamma_i^{(j-1)}$ is the position bias (exponential decay),
- $\text{CTR}(c, i)$ is the channel-specific click-through rate,
- $\text{Price}(c)$ is monetization value.

Spillover-adjusted utility:

$$u_i(c, j \mid \text{prior exposure in } (i', j')) = u_i(c, j) \times (1 + \Psi_{i' \rightarrow i}(c, j', j))$$

where $\Psi_{i' \rightarrow i}$ is the learned spillover multiplier (positive or negative).

2.3 System Objective Function

The global system value under allocation π is:

$$V(\pi) = \sum (u_i(\pi_i(j), j \mid \text{spillover history})) + \lambda_{\text{engage}} \times E(\pi) + \lambda_{\text{fair}} \times F(\pi)$$

Engagement regularizer:

$$E(\pi) = \sum \text{over } c [\sum \text{over } i (\text{indicator}(c \text{ in } \pi_i))$$

$\times e_i(c)]$

Fairness objective (via Herfindahl index):

$$F(\pi) = 1 - H(\pi)$$

$$H(\pi) = \sum_v \left[\left(\frac{\text{Visible_Allocation}_v}{\text{Total_Visible}} \right)^2 \right]$$

Overall optimization problem:

$$\pi^* = \text{maximize } V(\pi)$$

subject to:

- For all c : $\sum \text{indicator}(c \text{ in } \pi_i) \leq M_c$
- For all i, j : $\pi_i(j) \in C$
- $F(\pi) \geq F_{\min} = 0.65$
- For all emerging merchants m : $\text{Quota}_m(\pi) \geq 0.08$

3. Submodularity Structure and Approximation Guarantees

3.1 Submodularity and Diminishing Returns

A set function f is submodular if:

$$f(S \cup \{c\}) - f(S) \geq f(T \cup \{c\}) - f(T), \text{ for all } S \subseteq T, c \text{ not}$$

in T .

Theorem 1 (Submodularity of Base Revenue):

The utility function $V_{\text{revenue}}(\pi) = \sum u_i(\pi_i(j), j)$ is submodular in allocation decisions π , provided position biases satisfy $w_i^{(j+1)} / w_i^{(j)} \leq \gamma_i < 1$.

3.2 Localized Spillover Constraints

To recover approximate submodularity despite spillover, we impose:

$$\sum_{i' \neq i} | \Psi_{i' \rightarrow i}(\cdot) | \leq \delta_{\text{spill}} \times V_{\text{base}}(\pi)$$

where $\Psi_{i' \rightarrow i}$ denotes negative spillover terms and $\delta_{\text{spill}} \in (0, 1)$.

Theorem 2 (Approximate Submodularity):

Under the localization constraint, $V(\pi)$ is α -submodular with $\alpha = 1 - \delta_{\text{spill}}$.

3.3 Greedy Algorithm with Approximation Guarantee

Algorithm 1: SubmodularGreedy

Plain Text

Input: Candidate pool C , channels S , spillover model Ψ , objective V

Output: Allocation π

Initialize $\pi \leftarrow \text{empty}$, $T \leftarrow \text{empty}$

For $t = 1$ to total slots:

 For each available (i, j, c) :

$$\Delta V(i, j, c) = V(\pi \cup \{(i, j, c)\}) - V(\pi)$$

 Select (i^*, j^*, c^*) with maximum ΔV

$$\pi \leftarrow \pi \cup \{(i^*, j^*, c^*)\}$$

$$T \leftarrow T \cup \{c^*\}$$

Return π

Theorem 3 (Approximation Guarantee):

Under localization,

$$V(\pi_{\text{greedy}}) \geq (1 - 1/e) \times (1 - \delta_{\text{spill}}) \times V(\pi^*)$$

4. Directed Spillover Interaction Graph and Learning

4.1 Graphical Representation

We model cross-channel effects as a directed attributed graph:

$$G_{\text{spill}} = (S, E_{\text{spill}}, \Psi, L)$$

with asymmetric, position-dependent edge weights $\Psi_{i \rightarrow j}$.

4.2 Online Learning via Thompson Sampling

The state for each (user, candidate, channel) tuple is:

$$x(u, c, i) = [\text{user features, item features, channel features, time, ...}]$$

We use a Bayesian linear model:

$$P(\Psi \mid \text{data}) = \text{Normal}(\mu, \Sigma)$$

Update rules:

$$\mu^{(t+1)} = \mu^{(t)} + \Sigma^{(t)} x^{(t)} (y^{(t)} - \mu^{(t)T} x^{(t)})$$

$$\Sigma^{(t+1)^{-1}} = \Sigma^{(t)^{-1}} + \lambda x^{(t)} x^{(t)T}$$

Theorem 4 (Convergence):

Under realizability,

$$E[\| \mu^{(T)} - \mu^* \| ^2] = O(d / T)$$

5. Hierarchical Fairness via Stochastic Dominance

5.1 Stochastic Dominance Definition

First-order stochastic dominance: $A1 \geq_{SD} A2$ if and only if

$P(\text{Allocation}(A1) \geq t) \geq P(\text{Allocation}(A2) \geq t)$, for all t .

We enforce:

$$A(M_k) \geq_{SD} A(M_{k+1})$$

across merchant tiers.

5.2 Enforcement in Greedy Selection

During allocation, we dynamically cap emerging merchant share to maintain stochastic dominance while avoiding inefficient hard quotas.

6. Computational Efficiency and Real-Time Compatibility

6.1 Complexity

Naive exhaustive search: $O(n^{\sum(k_i)})$, intractable.

SubmodularGreedy complexity:

$$O(k_{max} \times n \times \sum(k_i) \times \log n)$$

6.2 Real-Time Optimizations

- 1) Candidate pruning (keep top-5k candidates)
- 2) Incremental updates (recompute only freed slots)
- 3) Spillover matrix caching
- 4) GPU parallelization

Final latency: 6.3 ms per optimization cycle.

7. Comprehensive Empirical Validation

7.1 Experimental Setup

- Platforms: E-commerce (120M DAU) & Ride-hailing (80M DAU)
- Period: 18 months
- Baselines: Manual, per-channel greedy, joint greedy (no spillover)
- Evaluation: Offline simulation + online A/B test (50M users)

7.2 Key Results

- Allocation efficiency: AllocOpt reaches 60.6% of theoretical optimum
- Revenue per user: +24.6% ($p < 0.001$)
- Conversion rate: +35.5%
- User satisfaction: +20.6%
- Emerging merchant GMV share: 8.1% \rightarrow 18.4%

7.3 Spillover Validation

Observed spillover magnitudes closely match model predictions (Home \rightarrow Search: +31.2% vs predicted +34.0%), confirming validity.

8. Ablation Study

Table 1.

Variant	Revenue/Slot	Fairness (1-H)	Latency (ms)
Manual	420	0.682	—
Per-channel	512	0.758	15
Joint submodular	588	0.781	18
+Spillover	612	0.823	22
+Stochastic fairness	597	0.916	6.3

Spillover and fairness each contribute meaningful gains without prohibitive cost.

9. Discussion

9.1 Theoretical Insights

- Per-channel silos leave ~21.9% of value unrealized.
- Spillover has strong structured patterns, enabling efficient learning.
- Fairness (via stochastic dominance) complements efficiency, rather than opposing it.

9.2 Limitations

- Long-term cross-session spillover not modeled.
- Tier thresholds are manually calibrated.
- Full Pareto frontier not computed.

10. Conclusion

AllocOpt unifies multi-channel resource allocation under a submodular constrained framework with directed cross-channel spillover. It achieves strong efficiency, real-time performance, and ecosystem fairness simultaneously.

In production:

- 38.7% allocation efficiency gain
- 24.6% revenue uplift
- 73.6% fairness improvement
- 6.3 ms latency

The framework generalizes to e-commerce, mobility, and media platforms with heterogeneous recommendation surfaces.

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