Challenges and Breakthroughs in Cross-Institutional Transaction Coordination Among Banks, Brokers, and Asset Managers

Abstract

In the context of accelerating financial market integration, cross-institutional transaction coordination among banks, brokers, and asset management institutions has become a crucial element in enhancing the efficiency of financial resource allocation and reducing transaction costs. However, current cross-institutional coordination is plagued by fragmented processes, ambiguous responsibilities, and low efficiency, severely constraining the high-quality development of the industry. This paper focuses on the entire chain of cross-institutional transaction coordination and systematically dissects the pain points, quantifies efficiency differences, and constructs incentive mechanisms using fault tree analysis, Poisson regression, data envelopment analysis (DEA), and logistic regression. The findings reveal that the pain points in cross-institutional coordination exhibit a distribution characterized by “high frequency at the funding end and high losses at the trading end.” Asset scale and cross-border attributes significantly positively influence the incidence rate of pain points. The “SOP standardization + profit-sharing” incentive coordination model achieves the highest efficiency, with an improvement of over 60% compared to traditional models (Raj, S., Khanna, A., & Pal, D., 2019). A three-dimensional incentive compatibility mechanism based on “profit sharing-risk sharing-reputation binding” can effectively resolve the issue of responsibility shirking. The research outcomes of this paper provide a theoretical framework and practical solutions for cross-institutional financial coordination, enriching the research system in the field of financial coordination and incentive mechanisms.